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Abstract
Recently, there has been much public debate on the deterioration of the EU-Turkish relationship
in terms of accession prospects for Turkey, many often blaming the democratic backsliding
within the country for the declining likelihood of accession. Enlargement literature generally
treats Turkey as a sui generis case for reasons such as geographic location and religious
background. This paper, however, considers Turkey a sui generis case for a different reason: it is
the only candidate country so far to transition away from, rather than towards, democracy. The
main aim of this paper is to address whether the deterioration of the prospects of Turkish
accession to the EU has been more the result of Turkish or EU actions. By analyzing the
development of Turkish accession through changes over time of indicators of democratic
backsliding and economic interdependence between Turkey and the EU, the paper shows which
actor has caused the pulling back of relations in a given time period. This study aims to fill a gap
in enlargement theory by analyzing a factor traditionally overlooked, regime change. Preliminary
empirical observations show that, as Turkey progressed from asymmetric to symmetric economic
interdependence with the EU, accession conditions began to delay until the halt we witness
today. The analysis demonstrates that, with Turkey sliding towards illiberal democracy and
progressing independently as a growing economic power, the EU has lost the leverage it once
had over Turkey. This outcome allows some predictions on the future of the EU-Turkish
relationship and the possible paths it may continue upon.
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When determining the success of the European Union (EU), many point to enlargement
as a key example of how the EU has fostered cooperation and spread peace across the continent.
They give the European Union credit as a normative power diffusing values of democracy,
respect of human rights, and free market economies to member and potential member states
alike1. As the European Union has grown, it has widened (increased the number of member
states) and deepened (increased its competences) thus making it more challenging institutionally
to make decisions. In particular, enlargement which requires unanimous voting across member
states is extremely difficult and many scholars theorize that “enlargement fatigue” has occurred
and predict the EU has possibly reached its cap in membership2. As more EU members have
joined and struggled with implementation of EU law after admittance in particular Eastern
European countries, it has led to a growing field of criticism against EU enlargement. Some
critics have suggested that EU candidate status has produced political consolidation in candidate
countries while trying to complete the acquis communautaire leading to a frustration among
citizens, further widening of the democratic deficit, and rise of populist parties and technocracy3.
Turkey has always proven to be the most controversial candidate country of the European
Union. First admitted as a candidate in 1999, Turkey has closed more chapters than other
candidate countries totaling 164. However, Turkey has become a unique EU candidate as it is
now in danger of potentially having to stall or halt accession entirely. Since the reign of
President Erdogan, public support of EU membership has declined5. In the past, the EU was able
to use a carrot and stick approach by incentivizing Turkey to cooperate by soliciting the potential
Hiski Haukkala, “The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood
Policy.” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 60, no. 9, 2008, pp. 1601–1622.
2 Ferdinando Nelli Feroci, “EU Enlargement Policy: From Success to Fatigue.” The Frontiers of Europe: A Transatlantic
Problem?, eds. Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu, Brookings Institution Press, 2011, pp. 25–34.
3 Christopher J. Bickerton, “EU enlargement: a critique,” Key Controversies in European Integration. 2nd ed. Eds. Hubert
Zimmermann and Andreas Dur. London: Palgrave, 2016. 212-218.
4 European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press release - Key findings of the 2016 Report on Turkey.
5 Nesibe Hichret Soy, “Survey: Turkish Support for EU Membership on Decline, Opinion Divided on NATO.” The Atlantic
Council. September 8th, 2013.
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of future EU membership. Recently, the EU has continuously postponed the accession progress
of Turkey and the carrots it can offer have declined as well as the perceived benefits of
membership6. Today accession has come to a boiling point as certain EU officials have
demanded all accession funds be cut due to concerns of human rights violations within Turkey
after the coup attempt of 2016.
There is large debate on what effect being an EU member has had on the evolution of
Turkish politics. Supporters of Turkish accession believe that being an EU member has caused
Turkey to pursue more liberal democratic policies than it would have on its own due to the desire
to join the EU such as removing the death penalty7. On the contrary, others have argued that the
EU had little influence on the progression of Turkey suggesting that the “Europeanization” of
Turkey’s was a strategic decision by the AKP party, rather than a result of wanting to become an
EU member8. This implies that Turkey would have evolved in the same way it has today had it
never been an EU candidate country. This paper aims to put these two phenomena of decline of
the EU-Turkish accession relationship and the impact of the EU on Turkish policy creation to
determine which actor, the EU or Turkey, is more to blame for the deteriorative relationship.
The paper is organized in the following order. It begins by introducing existing literature
on EU enlargement and what factors lead to accession. We then discuss why Turkey is treated as
a sui generis case and excluded from enlargement literature. Through our methods and
application section, we demonstrate what independent variables we will be testing and state our
hypothesis on the evolution of Turkish EU accession. The analysis section will exhibit through a
historical timeline and emphasis on moments of critical juncture how the relationship has
Nathalie Tocci, “Influencing Europe Through the Back Door: The Role of US-Turkey Relations.” Turkeys European Future:
Behind the Scenes of Americas Influence on EU-Turkey Relations, NYU Press, New York; London, 2011, pp. 104–127.
7 Paul Kubicek, “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities.” World Affairs, vol. 168, no. 2, 2005,
pp. 67–78.
8 Tarik Oĝuzlu, “Turkey and Europeanization of Foreign Policy?” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 125, no. 4, 2010, pp. 657–
683.
6

3

evolved and categorize each time period by whether accession progress (or lack thereof)
occurred. The conclusion will elaborate on the implications of this study and evaluate the
validity of the hypothesis. In addition, the conclusion will explore the limitations in this study,
where it could further develop, and our predictions on the future of the EU-Turkey relationship.
Literature Review
This section will compare existing literature on whether the EU or Turkey has been the
greater culprit in the deterioration of Turkish accession to the EU. We will analyze the theories
of EU enlargement and how the EU engages with national actors to push for EU accession. Then
we will analyze why Turkey has often been excluded from enlargement rhetoric and considered
as a sui generis case where the theory does not apply. This paper will argue for different reasons
why Turkey is a sui generis case for EU enlargement and what factors make it an unprecedented
EU candidate country.
European Union Enlargement Theories
Why is EU membership attractive?
Joining the European Union is not an easy task. Before the long and slow process of
opening and closing chapters of the EU acquis communautaire, countries first must meet the
criteria to even be considered an EU candidate. EU candidacy is determined by the 1993
Copenhagen criteria which requires that countries have institutions that guarantee political values
aligned with the EU (democracy, respect of human rights and minorities, and rule of law), liberal
economic principles (free and open market economy that is capable and promotes competition),
and the aptitude to meet commitments and duties of being an EU member9. So why do countries
want to subject themselves to these huge reforms and endless legislation of the EU? Countries
want to join the EU both because of the perceived benefits and for fear of exclusion.
9
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EU membership grants countries benefits in three specific areas: prosperity, security, and
aid in reinforcing democracy. From the prosperity perspective, many countries that have joined
the EU including recent additions of Romania and Bulgaria doubled their GDP in a little over a
decade after joining the EU10. In terms of security, though the EU is still lacking in terms of
foreign policy in comparison to its economic competencies, it still offers advantages such as a
naval forces to aid in migration in FRONTEX, a united foreign policy with delegations around
the world in the European External Action Services, and police coordination across borders
through Europol. Lastly, being an EU member not only helps countries become democracies,
but helps instill and enforce that democracy remains protected once a member. Non-EU
members take the enormous task of transforming their countries in order to become a member
state in order to reap the economic, defensive, and democratic benefits of EU membership.
On the other side, countries want to join the European Union for fear of the repercussions
of exclusion. In economic terms, countries that do not join the European Union will be subject to
much higher financial costs to import goods and services into EU countries unless they are part
of a negotiated agreement between the EU and a third country such as free trade agreement and
customs unions. In terms of security countries that do not join the EU can be more likely
pressured by other world powers such as Russia and China and thus will be enticed to have the
protection of the EU against coercive world powers. On the regional level, the cost of exclusion
to the EU means that countries will watch their neighbors that are granted EU membership rise
while they lag behind in benchmarks such as GDP growth. On the world stage, countries that do
not join the EU will see things such as foreign direct investment (FDI), development aid, and
trade diverted away and instead directed to EU member states due to outside actors favoring the

Rachel Epstein, “The benefits of EU enlargement: defending security, democracy, and prosperity,” Key Controversies in
European Integration. 2nd ed. Eds. Hubert Zimmermann and Andreas Dur. London: Palgrave, 2016. 206-212.
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accountability and stability of the EU over a single less powerful country11. Thus, the desire for
EU membership and the large hurdle to become a member is pursued by countries for the
perceived benefits as well as out of fear for marginalization and impediment of growth if they do
not join the EU.
How do candidate countries match the EU acquis communautaire?
Once EU candidate countries overcome the large obstacle of meeting the Copenhagen
criteria, they must match the EU acquis communautaire, meaning all EU existing laws, so that
national legislation reflects EU legislation. How is this done? The European Union acts as the
pull factor that pulls candidate countries and their prospective institutions in the direction of
matching the acquis communautaire. There are two dominant theories of how the European
Union utilizes this pull factor. First, rational choice institutionalism focuses on the fact that
actions are taken by domestic actors in response to EU incentives as a result of cost/benefit
analysis12. Specifically the European Union uses an external incentives model (EIM) to
encourage democratization of candidate countries through conditionality by rewarding matching
the acquis communautaire with opening more chapters and punishing defections by delaying
opening additional chapters or imposition of sanctions13. It must be clear that sanctions are not
issued lightly by the EU and are not issued due to slow or gradual reforms to meet acquis
communautaire, but rather are issued only in severe cases such as democratic backsliding14. The
EIM model is the main pull factor where through cost/benefit analysis, the EU increases the
benefits over the costs so that they pull countries into matching acquis communautaire.
Milada Anna Vachudova, “Democratization in Postcommunist Europe: Illiberal Regimes and the Leverage of International
Actors,” Center for European Studies Working Paper Series #139 2006.
12 Tanja A. Börzel and Digdem Soyaltin, “Europeanization in Turkey. Stretching a Concept to its Limits?”, KollegForschergruppe (KFG) “The Transformative Power of Europe“ Freie Universität Berlin. No. 36, February 2012.
13 Frank Schimmelfenning and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “The Europeanization of Eastern Europe: The External Incentives Model
Revisited,” JMF@25 Conference, June 22-23 2017, Florence, Italy. Unpublished conference paper. European University
Institute, 2017.
14 Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, “The External Incentives Model Revisited,” 3.
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Alternatively, sociological institutionalism explains that EU candidate countries adapt by the rise
of norms and customs that align with EU values into domestic institutions15. The EU often
combines strategies of both theories in incentivizing member countries to match EU acquis.
Through reformation of political institutions and pressure from domestic actors,
candidates are pushed towards pursuing actions to meet the EU acquis. Through cost/benefit
analysis, domestic actors see opportunity of EU incentives and create reform coalitions with
different political groups who support EU membership to enact policy to meet the EU acquis
communautaire 16. Through the practice of norms and using identity of “Europe”, norm
entrepreneurs and epistemic communities advocate for EU membership by promoting values of
EU such as protection of minorities, value of human rights, and democracy. Often the EU is
likely to find an ally in groups that have been highly marginalized in the past by older
institutions of member states and thus will likely to advocate for new norms of inclusion and
cohesion. Additional domestic factors that explains variation in success of adhering to EU acquis
are: power asymmetries, domestic incentives for change, and degrees of statehood17. Power
asymmetries represent that countries that are more dependent on EU are more likely to adopt EU
acquis communautaire at a more rapid pace, whereas countries that possess resources the EU
does not, such as minerals, may be slower and have fewer incentives to push to match the acquis
communautaire. Domestic incentives for change includes what national actors expect to gain
from EU membership, including non-liberal actors that do not share EU values. Even national
opposition to EU membership benefit by locking in institutional changes while their states
matches EU acquis18. Statehood represents how well a country can draft EU compatible law and

Börzel and Soyaltin, “Europeanization in Turkey”, 8.
Ibid.
17 Börzel and Soyaltin, “Europeanization in Turkey”, 10.
18 Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Is Europeanization Through Conditionality Sustainable? Lock-In of Institutional Change After EU
Accession,” Western Politics 35, no. 1, 2012: 20-35.
15
16

7

implement it at both the national and local level. Thus the pull of the EU, in benefits and norms,
is important but works best when accompanied by a strong push from domestic actors.
Exception to the rules: Turkey
Many existing theories on EU enlargement exclude Turkey as the “exception” to the rule
that cannot be analyzed in their theory and data. Turkey is excluded due to regional factors19 (the
questioning of whether Turkey should even be considered as part of Europe) and cultural
factors20 (questioning of a predominately Muslim demographic as just cause for exclusion). This
logic of excluding Turkey from enlargement theories is inherently flawed. This study proposes
that Turkey is excluded from EU enlargement theory because enlargement theory focuses on
democratization of countries and the EU having a fundamental role in this transition. Many of
the theories we presented stem from analysis after the enlargement of 2004 of countries from
communist to democratic states. On the contrary, Turkey has been a democracy since the
founding of the Republic after WWI in 1923. Thus, Turkey is a unique case in enlargement
theories not because of its cultural or geographical nature, but because it is the only EU
candidate country that has been a democracy long before accession talks ever began or rather the
EU even existed. However, the Turkey of the past decade has involved numerous reforms that
have caused Turkey to backslide into an illiberal democracy.
Turkey as a “special” European case
Turkey is different than other Muslim countries, other MENA countries, and EU member
states because it has a consolidated democracy. According to Samuel Huntington, democracy

Famous statement of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy. “I do not believe that Turkey belongs to Europe, and for a
simple reason: because it is in Asia Minor”
20 Melek Saral, “Turkey's 'Self' and 'Other' Definitions in the Course of the EU Accession Process, Amsterdam University Press,
Amsterdam, 2017.
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must be consolidated twice in order for a democracy to show stability21. In 1993 Bernard Lewis
argued that Turkey had been the only Muslim country to successfully solidify its democracy
twice over22. We can analyze four main factors that have separated Turkey from other countries:
first Turkey has never been subject to imperial rule or colonized by another world power, second
due to location and strategic decision Turkey has always had a close relationship with the West
and emulated democracy from a very early stage, third the founding of the Turkish Republic as
secular was fundamentally different than its neighbors at the time of its founding and lastly
Turkey has always had a large presence of civil society through its creation of a middle class
during the economic changes under Ataturk23. Why do all of these factors matter and how were
they able to be successfully consolidated? Turkey successfully created a democracy by doing it
gradually and by opting into it, rather than it being imposed upon by outside forces. EU
enlargement theory largely focuses on democratization that has been forced upon a country or
helped built by an existing democracy. Turkey after WWI, voluntarily restructured itself into a
democracy without the imposition of third actors. All of these factors and the historical legacy of
Turkey are important factors to consider for our case in determining why Turkey has pursued
certain policies relating to accession and how the EU has responded.
Illiberal vs. Liberal Democracy?
Now that we have distinguished Turkey from most EU candidate countries as most
candidates transition to democracy whereas Turkey today is transitioning away from democracy,
we must define what an illiberal democracy is. According to Fareed Zakaria, illiberal
democracies are democratic governments that bypass means of checks and balances, lessen the

21

Samuel P. Hungtington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century. London: University of Oklahoma Press,
1993. Print.
22 Bernard Lewis, “Why Turkey Is the only Muslim Democracy.” Middle East Quarterly, vol. 1, no.1, 1993, pp. 41-49.
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power of judiciary, and transfer power from the regional to the national level in order to have
consolidated controlling power24. The key difference Zakaria makes is that democracies are on
the rise, but there has been an naïve assumption of constitutional liberalism as the only type of
democracy. Constitutional liberalism is what many think of when referring to western
democracies including things like freedom of speech, universal suffrage, secularism, and
separation of powers25. However, countries can be democratic and have these inherent civil
liberties missing or rather ignored through a powerful executive. It is clear that the EU only
wants to admit candidate countries that fall under the constitutional liberal frame; however, it is
often a challenging and time consuming task for countries to adapt from autocratic governments
to constitutional liberal democracies. This can be seen through the fact that many Eastern Europe
countries are “hybrid” democracies in that they have the institutions established to support a
constitutional liberal democracy, but often leaders still show signs of their autocratic past.
Turkey is a sui generis EU candidate country. Not because of its geographic location or
demographic makeup, but because it is an established democracy that is now backsliding toward
an illiberal democracy. Through our methods and analysis section, we will analyze how Turkey
has transitioned from a constitutional liberal democracy to illiberal democracy especially in the
last decade under the rule of President Erdogan.
Methods and Application
This paper aims to fulfill a hole in the enlargement theory, through the case study of
Turkey, by including the additional factor of type of democracy into analyzing the evolution of
accession. Tree characteristics must be present to optimize candidate countries incentives to join
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the EU: asymmetric interdependence, enforcement, and meritocracy26. The first factor implies
that the EU has more power to get candidate countries to match the acquis communautaire when
the candidate has more to gain from EU membership than the EU does from their membership to
the EU. The second factors centers on the idea that the EU must be able to enforce what they
write in annual reports on candidate countries by only opening and closing chapters once all
factors match the acquis communautaire and staying firm in their delays if defections. The last
factor of meritocracy signifies that an EU candidate country must believe that EU does not hold
an unfair grudges against their submission as a member and this factor is especially important to
Turkey as meritocracy has been higher for this candidate than most27.
We have identified two variables that can help explain the deterioration of the EU
Turkish relationship: level of economic interdependence and democracy. This paper measures
economic interdependence because Turkey is the EU's 4th largest export market and 5th largest
provider of imports and the EU is by Turkey's number one import and export partner28. By using
indicators such as GDP per capita and levels of import and export between EU and Turkey
compared to other trade powers, we will analyze the evolution of economic interdependence
between the EU and Turkey. Secondly, we will analyze the level of democracy of the candidate
country, Turkey, as another variable to fill the hole of regime type in the enlargement literature
by using Freedom House scores. This paper will expand on moments of meritocracy in Turkish
accession, but not measure it directly in the hypothesis. By combining these two variables, this
paper aims to fill a gap in the hole of EU enlargement studies and how accession can deteriorate.
Turkey

Vachudova, “Democratization in Postcommunist Europe”, 7.
Atila Eralp and Torun Zerrin. “Europe as Seen from Turkey: From a Strategic Goal to an Instrumental Partnership?”
Perspectives, vol. 20, no. 2, 2012, pp. 83–101.
28 European Commission, “Countries and Regions: Turkey Trade”. 19, October 2017.
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Liberal Democracy

European
Union

Illiberal Democracy

Symmetric interdependence

Delay

Halt

Asymmetric interdependence

Progress

Delay

Before we can begin to apply predicted outcomes to our study of Turkey, we must define
what progress, delay, and halt in terms of accession means. Below we offer some signals we
anticipate29 to find in the data collection of accession conditions that will act as indicators as to
whether progress or stalling has occurred during the EU-Turkish accession.
Accession Conditions
Progress


Opening new chapters



Closing already opened
chapters

Delay




EU member states blocking

Halt


EU stopping all accession

chapters from closing

funds being sent to

Perception of lack of

candidate country

democracy in Turkey



Candidate country
leadership declaring
intention to not join EU

Based off initial research, we hypothesize the following:


The higher the level of asymmetric interdependence and the more liberal democracy, the
more likely for accession to progress



The higher level of symmetric interdependence and the more illiberal democracy, more
likely that accession will be delayed or halted entirely
Analysis section
The EU-Turkey relationship and evolution of accession is a long and complicated
phenomenon. For this purpose of this study, we will begin our analysis in 1999, the year Turkey
officially became an EU candidate country and the year Freedom House scores began. Prior to
candidacy, it is important to note that Turkey and the EU created a Customs Union in 1995
29
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creating a high level of asymmetric economic interdependence30. Our study has divided 1999 to
the present into subcategories based mainly on factors including changes in Freedom House
scores, change of ruling political parties in Turkey, and EU internal decisions.
Evolution of Turkish EU Accession
Time frame
1999-2002
2002-2005
2005-2010
2010-2012
2012-2016
2016-present

Democratic conditions Economic interdependence
Accession conditions
4.5
Asymmetric
Delay
↑ trend
Asymmetric
Progress
3.5
↑ trend
Asymmetric
Delay
3
↓ trend
AsymmetricSymmetric
Delay
3
↓ trend
AsymmetricSymmetric Progressdelayprogress
3.5
↓ trend
Symmetric
Delay halt
4.5

1999-2002: Turkey focuses on domestic affairs and little progress on EU accession
The first period we will analyze can be characterized as liberal democracy and
asymmetric interdependence, but a Turkish government that was too distracted by domestic
issues to really push for EU enlargement. Turkey from 1999-2002 was controlled by a coalition
government made up of the social- democratic Democratic Left (DSP), right of center
Motherland (ANAP), and the far right National Action Party (MHP)31. These three parties
worked together to accomplish economic goals, but resisted creating reforms that would have
fallen under the Copenhagen Criteria for enlargement. Frustrated by the lack of progress by
during this period, Turkey had a Freedom House score of 4.5, with one being the best and seven
being the worst and was labeled as “partially free”32. Since the Freedom House scores began in
1999, there is no comparison to what score Turkey would have received prior to being an official
EU candidate. Turkey’s Freedom House Score was on the poorer side and and remained stagnant
Sübidey Togan, “Opening up the Turkish Economy in the Context of the Customs Union with EU,” Journal of Economic
Integration, vol. 12, no. 2, 1997, pp. 157–179.
31 Ergun Özbudun, “Changes and Continuities in the Turkish Party System”, Journal of Representative Democracy vol 42, no..2,
2006: 129-137.
32 See Table 1
30
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from 1999-2001 because of the challenges the coalition government faced including the 2001
February financial crisis and Kurdish population challenges in Northern Iraq33. During this
period, Turkey was able to raise their GDP per capita by $600 and saw an average growth rate of
2% in GDP per capita34. Especially in the period from 1999-2000, GDP per capita grew by 10%
in one year showing commitment of EU to meet the Copenhagen criteria in its first year as a
candidate country35. However this enthusiasm, did not last long as 2002 saw a GDP per capita
decrease of -4% after the 2001 financial crisis which required an IMF bailout to save the Turkish
banks36. Thus, we would classify this time period as delayed accession due to initial enthusiasm
for meeting economic requirements of the EU, but internal turmoil of the Kurds and financial
problems caused the government led by an unstable coalition to focus on internal matters rather
than on pushing for the EU to begin accession negotiations.
2002-2005: AKP pushes for change and is rewarded with accession negotiations
In 2002, the golden age of Turkish EU enlargement began with the electoral win of the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) led under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The party not only won
the national elections, but dominated winning almost 2/3rd majority of parliamentary seats37. The
2002 parliamentary elections were historic because the secularist military allowed the Islamist
AKP political party to win without intervention, unlike multiple other elections since 1960 where
the military intervened to stop the rise of Islamic political parties. Since the electoral win,
Erdogan aggressively pushed for reforms as to increase Turkey’s standing and gain a definitive
start date on when chapters could be opened for accession. His efforts included legislation in the
summer of 2003 to remove broadcasting and teaching bans of Kurdish programming, reducing

Saral, “Turkey's 'Self', 101.
See Table 2
35 Ibid
36 CNN, “IMF Approves Turkish Loan,” 15, May 2001.
37 Gözde Yilmaz, “EU Conditionality Is Not the Only Game in Town! Domestic Drivers of Turkey's Europeanization,” Journal
of Turkish Studies vol 15, no.2, 2014, 303-321.
33
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the formal power of the Turkish military, and a law banning torture and these efforts were
followed by constitutional reforms in 2004 that revised the penal code38. In addition, the Cyprus
dispute found a resolution under the Annual Plan for Cyprus led by the United Nations and the
Turkish Cypriots cooperation was also good signal to the EU of Turkey’s commitment to
accession39. We can clearly see the improvement in addition with the upward trend of Freedom
house score going from a 4.5 to 3.540 the year after AKP came to power. In addition, after the
reforms of 2003 and constitutional reforms of 2004, the civil liberties rating, a subcategory under
Freedom House scores, went from a 4 to 341 thanks to inclusion of Kurdish culture in Turkish
legislation.
EU internal meritocracy was present in the early 2002 when former French President
Valery Giscard d'Estaing42 declared Turkish accession would destroy the European Union. In a
2003 report, the EU commended Turkey for its progress, but said additional reforms were needed
before negotiations could begin. The following year, the EU showed solidarity with Turkey
when the Kurdish separatist group, the PKK, was added to the EU terrorism watch list. This
solidarity was evident in Europe’s own past of secessionist terrorist groups including the IRA of
Ireland and ETA of Spain. In 2005, Turkey’s hard work finally paid off when the Commission
rewarded Turkish efforts with the opening of accession negotiations.
Erdogan’s commitment to pushing for EU backed reforms in order to get the EU to begin
opening chapters is also evident by the large increase in economic performance of Turkey in this
time period. From 2005-2002, Turkey’s GDP per capita grew by $2565 with an average growth
of 7% and from 2003 to 2004, GDP per capita grew by 13% in one year and 10% the following

38
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40 See Table 1
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year as well43. In addition, in terms of imports and exports to and from Turkey the economic
interdependence between the countries grew exponentially in this short time frame. From 20022005, Turkish exports send to the EU grew by 26% and 25% two years in a row as well as EU
imports into Turkey increasing an average of 28% in this period44. The interdependence was still
asymmetric in that the European Union was Turkey’s largest market to export goods, whereas
Turkey was the 5th largest market for EU goods behind the USA, MEA region, followed by
China and Russia. Thus the beginning years of the AKP party can be categorized as a
commitment to get the European Union to begin accession discussions by improving the liberal
democratic aspects of the government and making the economy more open and connected to the
European Union.
2005-2010: Accession begin
Entering 2005, all signs showed to positive progression for Turkey opening and closing
chapters if Turkey under the AKP party continued to pursue its rapid pace of change; however,
things did not go as planned. 2005 began with the screening process where the EU determines
which laws must be changed to match the acquis communautaire. Since chapter discussions have
begun, of the 35 total chapters, Turkey has opened 16 chapters, but only successfully closed one
chapter (Science & Research)45. What has been the blockade? The European Union naively
believing that the Cyprus dispute had been settled with the Annual Plan for Cyprus, allowed
Cyprus to join the EU in 2004. In reality the Cyprus dispute was not settled at all46. In 2006, due
to lack of progress in finding a solution, the European Union decided to freeze discussions on all

43

See Table 2
See Table 4 & 6
45 Amanda Paul, “Turkey-EU Relations: Time to Rebuild Trust,” European Policy Centre October 2012.
46 The Turkey- Cyprus dispute is still an ongoing battle between the two powers. The island is divided by control between the
government of Cyprus and the northern part under the Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus. The two nations have been through
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8 open chapters47 and stated that no chapters will close until Cyprus and Turkey can find a long
term solution. The blockades on opening new chapters continued in 2010 by efforts led by
France and Cyprus.
From 2005 to 2012, Turkey was able to maintain its highest Freedom House score, a “3”
by stably maintaining new civil liberties and political rights in Turkish legislation48. The increase
from rating 3.5 in 2004 to 3 in 2005 can be accounted for by the fact that constitutional reforms
of 2004 were taken into account for the score of 2005 as they are evaluated at the conclusion of
the year. Specifically, Turkey made great gains by going from a 4 to 3 in the civil liberties
rating49 thanks to inclusion of Kurdish rights into national legislation. However, 2005 and 2006
witnessed the beginning of domestic challenges in Turkey including increased PKK violence
after the end of its long ceasefire and slowdown in reforms50. Turkey had an election in 2007
where focus shifted from appealing to pro EU voters instead to AKP’s religious voters who
opposed many of the 2004 reforms that got Turkey to open chapters in the first place. Despite
this, the 2007 elections were deemed fair as more opposition parties including secularist and proKurdish parties won parliamentary seats51. The following year voting transferred to a referendum
on constitutional amendments that extended the power of the executive within Turkey.
The period following 2009 is where we begin to notice downward trends arrow given to
Turkey from Freedom House as a result of illiberal actions. 2009 was the first year to receive a
downward trend as a result of protests following the banning of pro-Kurdish party DTP52. 2010
was made up of the approval of constitutional changes that centered on reducing power of
military courts, reorganization of the judiciary, and persecution of leaders of the 1980 coup by a
Paul, “Turkey-EU Relations: Time to Rebuild Trust,” 2.
See Table 1
49 See Table 3
50 Börzel and Soyaltin, “Europeanization in Turkey”, 14.
51 Freedom House, “Turkey Scores,” 2008.
52 Sebnem Arsu, “Court Bans Kurdish Party in Turkey,” New York Times12, December 2009.
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higher margin of 58%53. For a third term, AKP dominated parliamentary elections in June 2011.
Throughout this period, trials against military officers attached to an attempted 2003 coup
against the AKP party caused declining arrows for suppression of political opponents. In 2011
these trials led to a mass resignation of many officers, allowing Erdogan to replace AKP skeptics
in the military with new officers more friendly towards his rule. Thus, in terms of democracy we
can characterize the period of 2005-2012 as an initial increase in democracy and civil rights
followed by a slowdown of reforms beginning in 2009 and a slow progression of the AKP party
to restructure Turkey into a more Islamic state and replace political opponents in the government
through constitutional referendums and trials. Thus, Freedom House Scores remain stagnant
from 2005 to 2012, but the first downward trend symbolizes a warning of the future decline in
scores that were soon to come.
In terms of economic interdependence, this period saw the initial increase of cooperation
between the EU and Turkey, followed by a halt as a result of the economic crisis in 2008.
Despite the economic crisis, from 2005-2012 Turkey was still able to increase their GDP per
capita by an average 12% percentage, high compared to the average 4% the EU grew GDP per
capita54. From 2005-2008, imports and exports between the EU and Turkey continued to grow,
but favoring the EU as EU imports into Turkey grew at a more rapid pace than Turkish exports
into the EU did55. 2008 was the first decline in interdependence since Turkey became a candidate
country. Following the typical asymmetric interdependence, Turkey was hurt more by the crisis
than the EU witnessing a -26% decline in Turkish exports to the EU compared to a -22%
decrease in EU exports to Turkey in 200956. However, the crisis only seemed to be a hiccup in

Freedom House, “Turkey Scores,” 2011.
See Table 2
55 See Table 6
56 See Table 7
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the relationship as trade between the countries and their GDP per capita seemed resilient and to
bounce back rather quickly. In 2010 and 2011, GDP per capita in Turkey grew by 13% year over
year two years in a row, adding to the popularity of Erdogan and his electoral victory in 2011 57.
Turkish exports in particular bounced back from the crisis and an increased percentage of exports
began to be sent to China in particular58. Thus the relationship remained asymmetric, but we
begin to see the first signs of Turkey turning to other powers over the European Union for trade
at the same time that illiberal democratic actions begin to occur within Turkey.
2010-2012: Period of delay
From 2010 to 2012, not a single new chapters was opened in Turkey’s accession to the
EU which led to an attempt to revive the relationship through the Positive Agenda59. In recent
years, especially after the termination of the Western European Union (WEU) in 2011. The
WEU was a military alliance between EU member states and partner countries that was replaced
in 2011 after the Treaty of Lisbon was implemented. Thus in 2011, Turkey lost a voice in
participating in European military policy outside of NATO and felt betrayed due to their higher
commitment to Europe both within NATO and WEU60. In the Positive Agenda meetings were
held in Turkey in 2012 where Turkish and EU leaders came together to create benchmarks to
allow for closing of EU chapters. Part of the desire for the revival was the sense of pro—EU
sentiment in Turkey declining through the rise of the less secular AKP party under Erdogan.
However, this renewed cooperation was put on hold from July to December 2012 under the
rotating presidency of the Council under Cyprus.
2012-2016: Illiberal democracy begins and Turkey looks for other trade partners
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Turkey began their first decline in Freedom House scores in 2012 against civil liberties
following court verdicts. The court verdicts were against military officers against supposed coup
attempts and Kurdish activists, causing civil liberties score to drop from a 3 to 461. The following
year did not include an actual drop in score, but did receive a downward trend following the Gezi
Protests in 2013. These protests began in Istanbul against the creation of Gezi Park, but soon
spread to the entire country and took on the nature of anti-government and dissatisfaction with
the illiberal ruling of Erdogan. The government responded through police brutality in order to
clear the crowds throughout the country. The Gezi protests as the first true social resistance
experienced in Turkey since becoming an EU candidate country, saw automatic delaying of
accession when the Commission postponed opening of Chapter 22 for fear of Turkey shifting
more and more towards an illiberal democracy62. The importance of Gezi Protests according to
Saatçioğlu is that the level of democracy within Turkey will determine the future of Turkish
accession and that the Gezi Park protests and EU backlash is a clear example of this retaliation
from the EU against defections in accession. This coincides with our theory and the first variable
that increase in illiberal democratic tendencies will be punished through delaying or halting of
accession.
2014 was also followed by another declining trend arrow in response to the corruption
charges against AKP and Erdogan in 2013, which did not prevent him from winning the
inaugural president post. Erdogan followed this political win through purges of business leaders,
journalists, and religious minorities by accusing them of engineering this 2013 corruption
scandal. As a result of the Gezi Protests and purges, in October 2014 the European Commission
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submitted its annual accession report that was more critical than ever before expressing concerns
in Turkey against democratic values63. Despite EU concerns, these purges continued in 2015
leading to a 3rd consecutive downward trend arrow especially against political opposition ahead
of parliamentary elections in November to allow Erdogan to press forward with the revised
executive system through a constitutional referendum. The European Union did not retract and
decide to give up on Turkey during this period, but rather reinvigorated the relationship through
the EU-Turkey summit in November 2015 where the EU decided to use the migration crisis and
the help they need from Turkey as leverage for EU accession. This summit involved the original
idea of the EU-Turkey deal allowing EU to return migrants to Turkey by promising future visa
liberalization for Turkish citizens to Schengen zone and progression on accession64.
In terms of economic interdependence, the period 2012-2016 witnessed the rise of
Turkey towards more economic symmetric dependence with the European Union. From 2012 to
2016, Turkey overall saw an average -4% decrease in imports into Turkey worldwide65.
Specifically after 2014, the amount of EU imports sent to Turkey drastically reduced while
Turkish exports entering the EU stayed relatively stable. Thus, we can see the beginning signs of
asymmetric interdependence fading as the balance between import and export between the EU
and Turkey begins to favor Turkey on a more equal playing field with the EU. Why is this
significant? According to our hypothesis then, this will likely reduce EU’s leverage on Turkey as
the perceived benefits of EU membership will decline as the candidate country becomes more
economically self-sufficient. In addition to trading of goods, this period began to see the
increased trading of services and FDI as over half of FDI going into Turkey came from the EU 66.
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The EU Turkey summit resulting in 2016 in the EU-Turkey deal to curb migration awarded
Turkey €3 billion in aid from the EU. Again, this shows the growing interdependence between
the EU and Turkey shifting from asymmetric towards symmetric interdependence. The EU
rewarded Turkey by progressing with accession for the EU-Turkey deal by thawing previously
frozen chapters.
2016-Present: Past the Point of No Return
The past two years have proven to be the most illiberal of Turkey as Turkey has regressed
from “partly free” to “not free” making it the largest decline by a single country in the past
decade according to Freedom House scores. 2016 witnessed the largest drop in Freedom House
scores dropping a whole point from 3.5 to 4.5, the levels Turkey once was in 1999, after the 2016
coup attempt and the government’s crackdown as a response67. In the beginning of 2016 in an
effort to silence Gülenist influence, the government closed Gülenist newspapers, television
stations, and seized companies; thus, the July coup was an attempt to overthrow the government
before the annual rotation in August of senior officials in the military and government before
Erdogan could replace Gülenist supporters68. The attempted coup of July 2016 was a tragic event
that left 260 people dead in Turkey69. Erdogan’s government was quick to punish those who
initiated the coup resulting in 58,000 arrests within a week of the coup and as of January 2018,
30 decrees have been issued by the government leading to the dismissal of more than 150,000
public servant, closure of 3,000 schools, and prosecution of almost 5,000 judges70. As a result of
these actions, both the overall score and subcategories of political rights (dropped to 4) and civil
liberties (dropped to a 5) reached unprecedented levels71. In November of 2016, the voice of EU
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citizens, the European Parliament voted to suspend all accession negotiations with Turkey72.
Although the vote did not suspend accession, the European Parliament does have the power to
influence enlargement as accession treaties must be approved by the European Parliament with
absolute majority. The European Parliament has never rejected an accession treaty thus far;
however, hypothetically, if Turkey progressed far enough to finalize an accession treaty the
European Parliament has the power to block EU membership73.
2017 marked the largest departure of Turkey yet as they officially transitioned to a “not
free” country through their decline in freedom rating from 4.5 to 5.5 as a result of the 2017
constitutional reform74. This reform centralized power further in the power of Erdogan as
president by transferring power away from local leaders and continued to remove his opponents
from government positions. Erdogan even called Germany reminiscent of its fascist and
declaring that “a battle has started between the cross and the half moon” days after Merkel
stopped rallies in Germany ahead of the April 2017 Turkish referendum due to the large Turkish
population in Germany75. The April 2017 referendum was successful (despite accusations of
voter fraud due to the close marginal win of 51%) for Erdogan as citizens voted to shift from a
parliamentary to presidential political system which further consolidated Erdogan’s power76.
Angela Merkel retaliated for these actions in September of 2017 when she declared that she
would seek to end Turkey’s membership talks, in an apparent shift of position during a televised
debate weeks before a German election77. Some now say that we are past the point of no return
and in April 2017, the European Parliament called for the formal suspension of Turkey’s
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membership bid with support from the Council. Even the Council of Europe, which Turkey is a
member of, has shown its disdain for this democratic backsliding by voting to reopen monitoring
of Turkey. This is a signal of embarrassment for Turkey as minoring was a prerequisite to
become a candidate country back in 1999, signaling that even an organization that Turkey is a
member of recognizes their democratic backsliding78.
Economic interdependence has been minimally affected by the decline in democracy
within Turkey since the 2016 coup. Although inflation reached a 14 year high of almost 13% in
2017 and Turkish lira lost 11% of its value, GDP continue to grow at 11% with the third quarter
of 201779. In addition, although FDI from the US declined from 2017 to 2016 by €172 million
due to fears of political instability, FDI from the EU grew by €700 million in this same period80.
Thus, foreign investors from Turkey’s biggest trade partner, the EU, were not scared away of
continuing to engage in economic interdependence after the coup. The EU despite intense
criticism of Erdogan after the coup has reinitiated conversations to revamp the EU-Turkey
customs union for the future81. In this same period, we see an increase in Turkey turning trade
towards China and Russia thus continuing along the pattern of the previous period toward
symmetric interdependence as Turkey diversifies its trade partners82. The significance of this is
that although the coup of 2016 and transition to consolidated presidential system of 2017 have
had strains on EU-Turkish accession, they have not had a great influence on decreasing trade
interdependence between the two powers.
Conclusion
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The deterioration of Turkish accession into the European Union is the fault of both
Turkey and the European Union with each member pulling back from the relationship more at
different time periods. After gaining candidacy status in 1999, the real push for accession
negotiations began after the election of the AKP party under Erdogan in 2002. Through reforms
expanding political rights and increasing trade with the European Union, Turkey was rewarded
in 2005 when the EU deemed it ready to begin opening chapters and earned an increase in
Freedom House scores. Throughout the history of EU accession, meritocracy has proved an
obstacle to EU accession from specific member states mainly from France, Germany, and
Cyprus causing a halting of chapters. Economic interdependence temporarily declined as a result
of the crisis in 2008, but trade quickly revived after the crisis, although first signs of illiberal
actions began to be shown in Turkey through constitutional referendums. From 2012 to 2016,
Freedom House scores declined from “partly free” to “not free” through purges, reduction of the
powers of the courts, and hitting a boiling point in the July 2016 coup attempt. At this same time,
Turkey moved from asymmetric towards more symmetric interdependence with the EU as it
expanded exports away from the EU and towards other powers such as China and Russia and
overall decreasing the level of imports from abroad. The European Union’s leverage to threaten
to delay or halt accession has decreased as Turkey has become a more powerful economic actor.
Thus Turkish accession has mirrored a Michael Jackson style moonwalk, constantly moving
backwards, but switching which foot or country is taking the actions to pull accession
backwards.
What if the future of EU-Turkish relations?
What does the sui generis case of Turkey teach us about future prospects for EU
membership? The more illiberal the candidate country became, the more meritocracy the
candidate country faced in the EU. In the beginning of accession, when the EU halted or delayed
25

accession, Turkey was quick to alter policy to get back into the good graces of the EU and
accession negotiations such as in the 1980s. So how has Turkey changed? Economic
interdependence between Turkey and the EU is still important; however, Turkey’s is not the
same country it was when it joined the Customs Union or became an EU candidate. GDP of
Tukey has increased fivefold just since the election of Erdogan in 2002 and by more than 80
times since first applying in the 1960s83. In addition, recent policies of Erdogan have seen new
friendless towards other illiberal powers such as Russia and China.
Turkey continuing to pursue illiberal democratic actions despite EU threats to cut off
accession well turning trade away from the EU and towards other partners, would suggest that
the Turkey has become less interested or at least fed up with waiting for EU membership.
However, in February of 2018 President Erdogan visited EU leaders in Italy and France and
declared that, “We want full membership. Other options are not satisfactory”84. What can explain
this recent revival of desire for EU membership on behalf of Erdogan? Throughout this study, we
have seen increased emphasis on the side of Erdogan towards positive EU discourse during his
political campaigning. Some have argued that AKP uses supporting EU accession as a scapegoat
to escape the suspicious activity of its Islamist agenda within the domestic and international
atmospheres85. Thus some theorists like Börzel and Soyaltin believe that, “domestic change in
Turkey is less driven by EU and its fading conditionality, but by the political agenda of the
Turkish ruling elites and their preference for consolidating their political power”86. The next
Turkish elections are set for November 2019 for both President and the National Assembly; thus,
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we predict that Erdogan will continue to push a positive EU discourse while he remains on the
campaign trail if he believes it will help him to continue to consolidate power within Turkey.
There are three possible paths for the future of EU-Turkish relationships. The first option
would be convergence (EU accepting Turkish accession), competition (Turkey continues to turn
towards other trade partners and accession completely comes to a halt), and cooperation (Turkey
and EU work together but through a privileged partnership and give up on accession)87. An
example of this “privileged partnership” rather than full EU membership may include the
revamped Customs Union. We predict that if Turkey continues to grow economically and slide
further to illiberal democracy, the competition scenario will be the most likely and accession will
slide fully from delay to a full halt as EU leverage continues to dissipate.
Limitations
This paper attempted to study the deterioration of Turkish accession by focusing on
democratic standing and level of interdependence between Turkey and the EU. Future research
could expand on different definitions of democracy beyond using Freedom House scores. In
addition, there could be many ways to measure interdependence to include goods and services,
FDI, international organization interdependence that are beyond the scope of this paper. In
addition, this paper may have lessons for future enlargement, but many of its key findings are
limited to Turkey as a candidate country. The EU has shown great excitement for the Wester
Balkan countries joining by 2025 and although they are far from ready, they have not
experienced democratic backsliding like Turkey has either. Some additional factors that was
beyond the scope of this paper was to dive into the correlation between deterioration of Turkish
EU accession and its connection with Turkey’s role in NATO. In addition, this analysis did not
dive deep into the Cyprus settlement issue with Turkey, but could be further elaborated in how
Bianca Benvenuti, “The Migration Paradox and EU-Turkey Relations,” Instituto Affari Internazionali IAI Working Paper
17/05 2017.
87
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this has had consequences on EU accession at given time periods. Future research could also
include the analysis on the role of civil society within Turkey and how they have pursued the
continuance of Turkish accession to the EU. Lastly, an interesting elaboration on this study
would be to see if the deterioration of Turkish accession has coincided with declining USTurkish relationships over time.
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Table 1

Turkey Freedom House Score
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2007
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6
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1= Best, 7=Worst

Source: Freedom House Scores
Table 2

GDP per capita
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Table 3

Civil Liberties of Turkey 1999-2018
1
2
3
4
5
6
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1= BEST, 7=WORST

Source: Freedom House Scores
Table 4
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Table 5

Political Rights of Turkey 1999-2008
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1=BEST, 7=WORST

Source: Freedom House Score

Table 6
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Table 7
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